The enormous but beneficial delay of the Algerian renewable energy project
The popular proverb saying that every delay has something beneficial "koul 3atla fiha kheir" can very well be applied to this contribution .
Indeed, the huge delay in the Algerian renewable energy (EnR) project has paradoxically turned out to be very beneficial. On the other hand, for a number of countries that are quicker in their work, the fact of having committed themselves to it too hastily does not seem to have been very profitable to them, like, among others, Morocco, Tunisia and even the United States. .
Case of Algeria
The national renewable energy development program was adopted in 2011 with the excessive ambition of installing 22,000 megawatts (MW) of power by 2030. This decision, premature to say the least, was taken at the time that the technologies had not yet reached maturity, that the experience required to implement them was practically non-existent and that the project was far from profitable. Initially based essentially on thermo-solar CSP (Concentrated Solar Power), this technology consisted of concentrating solar radiation to reach the high temperatures needed to drive the steam turbines of a conventional power plant.
Thermo-solar energy only replaces fossil or nuclear energy as sources of heat, hence the heaviness and high cost of the resulting complex.
The least that can be said of such a program is that it seems to have been decided on in haste, in a sort of mimicry with what was being done abroad. Except that, abroad, these projects were heavily subsidized, betting that advances in technology and economies of scale would eventually reduce costs enough to reach parity with those of conventional electricity.
Moreover, we had repeatedly expressed reservations about the premature and unprofitable adoption of this project, which at the time exceeded 100 billion dollars (i.e. 5 million dollars per MW).
We then suggested postponing it until the evolution of technologies and the reduction of costs allow it to cross the break-even point. It being understood that in the meantime we could undertake small pilot projects to familiarize ourselves with the most promising technologies and prepare to move up a gear as soon as parity is reached between the green kWh and that of conventional electricity. .
Despite these reservations, the project was maintained as it was according to the initial schedule. But, instead of advancing according to forecasts, it has continued to tread water by accumulating 10 years behind.
In the end, there is reason to rejoice at this inability to start the project because the accumulated delay has paradoxically turned out to be very beneficial for the country instead of being detrimental to it. The hesitations, the prevarications, the reversals and the absence of a reliable roadmap have, by immobilizing the project, made it possible to save, involuntarily that is understood, billions of dollars which, otherwise would have been uselessly swallowed up in the financial pit of an unprofitable project.
In 2015, after realizing that in addition to the prohibitive costs, the thermo-solar technology was outdated, the program was completely modified with the predominance of photovoltaics (PV) replacing the thermo-solar CSP. Indeed, PV dominates almost all of the world's green electricity production with 580 gigawatts (GW) of cumulative power over the last 10 years while the previously dominant CSP has almost disappeared with only 5.5 GW or 0.9% of the total.
Here too, the same shortcomings as before prevented the new program from really taking off, although in the meantime, in 2016, the project was promoted to the rank of national priority. Despite this status, only the poor performance of 364.3 MW, that is to say only 1.7% of the 22,000 MW of the program, has been achieved so far.
But it would have been better not to start at all because it resulted in considerable additional costs which had a very negative impact on its profitability.
Indeed, the 364.3 MW returned to more than 1200 billion dinars worth at the time 1.5 billion dollars, which corresponded to more than 4 million dollars per MW while it was running around 1 million dollars as evidenced, below, by the cost of the photovoltaic power plant of Noor Ouazazate 4 in Morocco. This time, again, the delay was beneficial since only 1.7% of a loss-making project could be carried out. What would have happened if, between 2011 and 2020, things had gone according to plan with these kinds of costs.
Recently, after several minor modifications which did not succeed, the program has, once again. been redefined by reducing it from 22,000 MW to 15,000 MW, by shortening it from 20 years to 15 years and by postponing its completion from 2030 to 2035. It was, therefore, implicitly recognized that the old program n was more tenable, but without making the new one any more convincing.
Case of Morocco
Unlike the Algerian project, which is unable to take off, the Moroccan project has had the merit of progressing at a fairly steady pace. But there its merit ends because if we dissect the four power plants of the Noor Ouarzazate solar complex, we find, which is quite unexpected, that the first three power plants are based on outdated thermo-solar technologies (CSP) and rarely implemented today because of excessive costs and cumbersome installations.
This is how the cost of the 160 MW of the first cylindro-parabolic CSP plant of Noor Ouarzazate 1, commissioned in February 2016, amounted to nearly 900 million dollars, or about 5 million dollars per MW while currently the photovoltaic MW has fallen to less than 1 million dollars and continues to decrease. Ditto for the costs of the 200 MW of the cylindro-parabolic CSP plant of Noor Ouarzazate 2 commissioned in January 2018 and the 150 MW of the CSP tower plant of Noor Ouarzazate 3 commissioned in August 2018 which also rose at over $5 million per MW.
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The high costs of CSP have resulted in purchase prices per kWh equivalent to 0.16 dollars, 0.14 and 0.14 dollars for Noor Ouarzazate 1, 2 and 3 respectively while the kWh of PV has currently reached lows of around $0.03. Such high prices will require the use of subsidies to moderate the consumer bill.
On the other hand, the situation turned out to be quite different for the 72 MW of the fully photovoltaic power plant of Noor Ouarzazate 4, commissioned in June 2018 with MW costs reduced to a fifth of those of the CSP. Indeed, this project only returned to a small million dollars per MW compared to the 5 million dollars per MW for thermo-solar and the price per kWh fell to 0.052 dollars compared to 0.18 dollars, 0, $15 and $0.16 per kWh from previous CSP plants.
In other words, the same quantity of photovoltaic electricity could have been produced for the first three CSP plants of the Ouarzazate complex with investments five times lower and the kWh would have been substantially cheaper than those of the thermo- solar.
We can therefore conclude that the very advantageous costs of photovoltaics largely plead in its favor and sound like a belated disavowal of the thermo-solar option.
It should be noted that the companies that built or supported the Ouarzazate complex are known to be specialized mainly in thermo-solar. They perhaps had no other choice but to promote their product. The fact remains that, despite its costs and its heaviness, the thermo-solar option continues to be chosen, at least in part, to Morocco's future solar projects.
Added to this is the paradox of the so-called hybrid power plant of Ain Béni Mathar, presented as an innovative solar project. In reality, almost 97% of its electricity is produced by consuming gas, which is in complete contradiction with a solar project whose goal is to save it instead of dissipating it in this way, especially for a country that 'imported. In reality, it is a classic gas power plant hidden behind a thermo-solar camouflage.
The same can be said for the Hassi R’mel hybrid power plant in Algeria. In fact, regardless of the angle from which the problem is approached, there is no valid reason justifying this kind of hybridization.
Case of Tunisia
A power of 4500 MW is planned by the TuNur project in the south-west of the country, more precisely in Rjim Maâtoug. Again based on CSP thermo-solar, it is largely intended to supply Europe with green electricity. In a first phase, it is planned to develop a 250 MW thermo-solar CSP tower power plant there, connected to the island of Malta via a submarine high-voltage direct current (HVDC) line.
The cost of the first 250 MW has been estimated at 1.6 billion euros (about 2 billion dollars) or more than 6 million dollars per MW. So a cost even higher than the already excessive cost of the power plant of the same nature (CSP tower) of Noor Ouarzazate 3 which returned to 5 million dollars per MW while, let us repeat, the PV has decreased to less than 1 million dollars.
The question then arises as to why do we insist on favoring the heavy and very expensive technology of solar thermal CSP at the expense of photovoltaics, which are much less expensive and easier to use?
Another question concerns the argument put forward to justify the export of green electricity to Europe, an argument according to which the solar radiation in southern Tunisia is more than twice that of Europe and therefore can produce more double the electricity for the same investment. It is thus hoped that this increased electricity productivity will offset the cost of an undersea power line for its profitable delivery to Europe.
But this is not true for Malta, a very sunny island due to its position well south of Sicily and Tunis. As a result, a solar power plant, located on the island, would produce almost as much electricity as a plant located in southern Tunisia. This alternative would be much more profitable because it would avoid the installation of a costly power line between Tunisia and Malta while benefiting from the less expensive photovoltaic option. Hence the more than questionable economic interest of this first phase of the project to Malta.
Case of the United States
The implementation of obsolete solar projects is not only the prerogative of developing countries like Morocco or Algeria, but also concerns countries at the forefront of development like the USA .
Thus, the example of the Crescent Dunes solar power plant in Nevada, considered to be the largest of its kind at the time with a capacity of 110 MW, is particularly instructive. At a cost of 1 billion dollars, that is to say more than 9 million dollars per MW, this plant, initially described as futuristic, quickly disappointed and proved to be outdated even before being put into full operation. operation.
The main reason is that, undertaken between 2011 and 2015, it was based on the expensive and unprofitable tower CSP thermo-solar. When it was commissioned in 2015, it was overtaken by photovoltaics, which had become more attractive because it was simpler, more versatile and above all less expensive.
This was noted by Google, one of the investors in the project, which quickly withdrew while there was still time. Note that the Crescent Dunes tower CSP plant is similar to that of Noor Ouarzazate 3.
Other American projects have had the time, in extremis, to switch from thermo-solar to photovoltaic. But others couldn't, such as Crescent Dunes, which ended up being shut down and may be released for sale as parts.
By Mohamed Terkmani, former director at Sonatrach
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