Liberalization of the electricity sector: the large scam

Initially justified by a lower price promise for French consumers, the liberalization of the electricity distribution sector to individuals has finally resulted in a surge in regulated sales prices (TRV) of EDF and market pricesprivate during the decade 2010. Le 1^er août dernier, les TRV ont encore augmenté de 1,23%, cette hausse faisant suite à un renchérissement spectACulaire de 5,9% intervenu le 1^er juin dernier.Liberalization is also responsible for an explosion of abuse of energy suppliers against French households, which is alarmed today by the National Energy Mediator.It enjoins us to question the relevance of privatization and the systematic competition of the former so -called "public monopoly" markets.

Bad news for the French household portfolio. Le 1^er août dernier, les tarifs réglementés de vente (TRV) qui déterminent les montants des fACtures d’électricité domestique d’EDF, dont s’ACquittent encore 28 millions de ménages français, ont augmenté de 1,23%[1].Last June, they had already jumped 5.9%, the highest increaaaase in 20 years [2].Such an increaaaase was equivalent to 90 euros of invoice per year for a home heated to electricity, a considerable part of the rest of households belonging to the first three deciles of income. Or, un tiers d’entre eux est déjà en situation de précarité énergétique en France^[3].

Under pressure from the movement of "yellow vests", the government had nevertheless announced that they want to postpone their increaaaase.AFTer experiencing a flight between 2010 and 2018, TRVs had to temporarily stabilize.Such a respite would have been welcome because their annual revaluation had led to an increaaaase in electricity prices of more than 20%[4] [5].Las, the energy regulatory commission (CRE) has decided otherwise.She recalled last February that an increaaaase of 5.9% should take plACe in June 2019 at the latest.

Dans le même temps, le phénomène de précarité énergétique se développe en France et touche aujourd’hui 12% des ménages^[6]. La hausse des prix de l’électricité et du gaz fait courir le risque à une part croissante d’entre eux de basculer dans des situations d’insolvabilité ou de grave privation énergétique, dont plusieurs organisations comme la Fondation Abbé Pierre^[7], le CREAI^[8] ou le CLER^[9] soulignent les effets dévastateurs sur l’état de santé physique et psycho-sociale des personnes concernées.

Beyond being excessive, the current increaaaase in electricity prices is largely the consequence of the privatization and competition policy in the electricity and gas distribution sector. La principale justification politique apportée par la Commission européenne à cette mise en concurrence était pourtant de permettre aux consommateurs de bénéficier de prix bas^[10].

Genesis of liberalization

In France, under the effect of the transposition of the European directives for the liberalization of the electricity and gas supply markets to individuals [11], the latter have opened up to competition. En 2000, la CRE était créée afin de veiller au fonctionnement du marché en voie de libéralisation de l’énergie et d’arbitrer les différends entre opérateurs et consommateurs^[12]. En 2004, EDF perdait son statut d’établissement public à carACtère industriel et commercial (EPIC) pour devenir une société anonyme (SA) ^[13][14].This choice was made to reduce the company to the state of simple competitor within the future private energy distribution market. Enfin, début 2007, les marchés de distribution du gaz et de l’électricité aux ménages ont été définitivement libéralisés^[15].On this date, French households were able to take out a supply contrACt with private competing operators.

Conformément aux exigences deBrussels,Paris a ainsi mis en plACe un système de fonctionnement de marché privé dont il était attendu qu’il favorise la concurrence entre distributeurs, et par là, une baisse des prix des énergies dont les consommateurs devaient être les bénéficiaires^[16]. Il s’agissait également de permettre à tout opérateur privé de s’installer sur le marché de distribution de l’énergie et à ces nouveaux utilisateurs des réseaux de distribution de bénéficier, selon les termes de la Commission, d’un droit d’ACcès « libre, transparent et non-discriminatoire »^[17].

In reality, the dismantling of public distribution monopolies in force in many European countries has had an exACtly opposite effect.The sale prices of energies to individuals have literally flew off.The liberalization of the electricity market led to a three -digit of electricity prices in Spain [18] [19]. Elle a également été particulièrement douloureuse au Danemark, en Suède et au Royaume-Uni^[20] tandis que dans l’Hexagone, les prix de l’électricité connaissent aujourd’hui un plus haut historique et continuent d’augmenter à un rythme sans précédent depuis le Second Choc pétrolier[21].How could we get to such a situation?

Dans le sillage de la libéralisation du marché national de distribution de l’électricité en 2007, le législateur fait voter le 7 décembre 2010 la loi NOME^[22], portant sur une nouvelle organisation des marchés de l’électricité.Cette loi est à l’origine de la création d’un mécanisme dit d’« ACcès régulé à l’énergie nucléaire historique» ou « ARENH », mécanisme par lequel EDF se voit obligé de céder une part de son électricité produite grâce au nucléaire à ses concurrents pour des tarifs « représentatifs des conditions économiques de production » selon les termes de la loi ^[23].In France, the nuclear sector makes it possible to produce electricity at low prices, because it is lower than production sources other than hydraulics [24].The objective was therefore to stimulate competition, so that alternative suppliers are obtaining electricity at the same cost as EDF and lower their distribution rates.

Concreaaately, with ARENH, EDF had to sell a quarter of its nuclear production to private competition, at a price set by ministerial decreaaae of € 42/MWh [25].EDF competitors thus had ACcess to 100 TWh/year of nuclear electricity.However, in a context of globalization of the energies market, these companies are also led to supply themselves on foreign markets in which electricity prices, subject to international conjuncture, are strongly unstable.Sometimes, as in 2016, world market prices are collapsing.During this period, EDF therefore sold no kilowatt to its competitors who preferred.Other times, on the contrary, in a context of supply crisis or inflation of demand, prices are increaaaasing and ARENH becomes competitive.This mechanism thus offered EDF competing operators an opportunity for arbitration: they could supply themselves on the world market when prices were low or via ARENH when they were high.

During the 2010s, however, due to the appetite of the Asian market, international prices increaaaased a lot, so the ARENH has become hyper-competitive with regard to the world market.International private suppliers rushed to ARENH and exploded its sales ceiling.132.98 TWh of electricity were requested for the year 2019, 33 TWh more than the limit set by law [26], forcing the government and the parliament to consider urgently, and against the opinion ofEDF, an increaaaase in the sales ceiling [27] [28] [29] [30].In the meantime, to continue to provide their customers, private operators have been forced to turn to the international market [31].

The myth of self -regulation

The story could have stopped there.EDF would have seen its increaaaased competitiveness increaaaase in the distribution market to individuals, at the expense of other private operators subject to the high and not very competitive prices on the international market.However, adopting the "hard line" interpretation of the European Commission's competition principle, the CRE has estimated what an increaaaase in selling price differences between those of EDF and other private operators represented a threat against thePrinciple of free competition.She then decided to intervene in order to strengthen EDF's competitive advantage by force.In a deliberation dating from last February, it advocated in the French government to implement an increaaaase in TRV in order to respect the principle of "tales" of tariffs [32].

According to this anglicism which now constitutes a concept of European economic law, the level of TRVs must be fixed so that any private supplier is able to compete with them in order to guarantee its maintenance on the market [33].Clearly, tales presupposes a total reversal of the market regulatory paradigm.It protects the interests of the supply (suppliers) rather than those of demand (households).As such, 40% of the increaaaase in the price offered by CRE to the government - € 3.3/MWh on € 8.3/MWh - is not linked to the objective increaaaase in operating costs from EDF.It comes from a methodological choice consisting in corresponding the sale price of the electricity produced by EDF nuclear to that fixed within the framework of ARENH [34].The CRE's objective was thus to limit the negative effects that low TRVs could have on the capACity of penetration and maintenance on the market of private competitive operators of EDF.

In addition, Brussels was not content to weaken EDF's position on the distribution market to individuals.The Commission also ordered France to permanently delete its pricing regulatory system.Adopted on April 11, the PACte law has already scheduled the abolition of TRVs for individuals and condominiums on July 1, 2023 [35]. Elle constitue la suite logique d’un arrêt du Conseil d’État où ce dernier estimait que le maintien des TRV était « contraire au droit de l’Union européenne », constituant « une entrave à la réalisation de marchés de l’électricité et du gaz naturel libres et concurrentiels »^[36].

Competition (s) and civil war

The rest of the story has made the front page of the press in recent months, against the bACkdrop of social and political tensions brutally revived by the movement of yellow vests, but also of growing concern expressed by French households as for theAcquitment of their energy invoices in explosion.

The Government validation of CRE recommendations first made consumer associations jump.In April, the CLCV and UFC-Que Choisir sent an open letter to the President of the Republic, enjoining him to give up the increaaaase in the tariff [37].According to them, "approving this increaaaase would amount to turning their bACks on the expectations of the French in terms of purchasing power and the logic of dialogue implemented with them since the great national debate".The letter remained unanswered.

Upon announcement of the effective increaaaase in prices last June, the two associations decide to seize the Council of State [38].The secreaaatary general of the CLCV, François Carlier, justified this referral on RTL: "It has been ten years since the French energy distribution market has been liberalized.The fACt that the authorities now claim to be obliged to increaaaase the sales prices of the historic supplier in order to stimulate competition is completely paradoxical.(...) This is in any case an unjustifiable decision if we plACe ourselves from the point of view of the interest of consumers for whom the only thing that counts is to benefit from affordable prices.The proposal for an increaaaase in CRE therefore poses law problems and following it, the government commits a fault ”[39].

Consumer associations have not been the only ones to reACt to the increaaaase in TRV.The Competition Authority has herself challenged it.In a notice of March 25, the AAI (Independent Administrative Authority) in charge of market regulations in France considered that the proposed increaaaase "would lead to paying consumers the effects of the ceiling of regulated ACcess to electricitynuclear.The additional cost would be 600 million euros for the latter.(…) The rise in prices therefore appears as contrary to the will of the Parliament to offer prices allowing consumers to return the benefit of the competitiveness of the historic nuclear park.(…) Such regulation would lead to transforming, on the retail market to individuals, the ceiling price regulated in floor price for EDF, with the effect of offering customers who have remained faithful to TRV the paradoxical guarantee of “benefiting fromhighest market prices ».^[40]

In recent months, Jean-Bernard Lévy, director of EDF, alerted public opinion to the position of weakness in which EDF is currently put by the fault of the CRE and the liberal doctrine of the "private electricity market"defended by the Commission. Dans une tribune parue dans Le Figaro en mai dernier^[41], c’est le principe de fonctionnement même de l’ARENH qu’il dénonçait, permettant selon lui à des ACteurs privés d’ACcroître considérablement leurs marges sur le dos d’investissements publics, en se dédouanant des charges et risques financiers liés à l’entretien matériel du réseau.Last June, he was sounding alarm: "For years, EDF has been the victim of the current system for regulating nuclear energy.We cannot oblige EDF, a company which is responsible for all infrastructural investments, to subsidize other private electricity distributors which do not invest in the public network (...).Our competitors wait for us to provide them with an energy at an ultra-competitive price that they do not even produce in order to increaaaase their margins. Aujourd’hui, des grands groupes s’implantent sur le marché de la distribution d’électricité et viennent faire beaucoup d’argent aux dépens d’EDF»^[42].

It is true that the principle of separation of network managers and service providers wanted by Brussels today produces such a level of inconsistency as even ultra-liberal and minarchist think-tanks like the Ifrap Foundation recognize that itis not viable, even absurd. Selon l’IFRAP, EDF est : « victime d’un système qui contraint l’entreprise à subventionner ses propres concurrents privés alors que dans un fonctionnement de marché libéralisé, ces derniers devraient plutôt réaliser les investissements pour produire eux-mêmes de l’électricité »^[43].EDF is thus found in a unfair and insane situation, whether from the point of view of the general interest mission of public services or a competitive market operation.The company finds itself fACed with competitors who produce no added value in the economy, and therefore virtually no wealth, but still live an energy rent.

It is therefore allowed to ACquiesce the words of Henri Guaino, former commissioner general of the plan who, as early as 2002 in the columns of the world, alerted public opinion to "the economic and technical absurdity of the separation of the production sectorsand energy distribution ”.According to him, "the privatization desired by the Commission is a decoy, taking into ACcount the considerable financing needs called the renewal of production equipment and the diversification of energy production methods. (…) Comme celle de la SNCF, la réorganisation d’EDF est porteuse de conséquences graves, que les institutions européennes s’efforcent de dissimuler derrière de pseudo-impératifs d’efficACité concurrentielle »^[44].

Lessons of an ideological mirage

In summary, the case of liberalization and privatization of the electricity market in France is instructive in several respects.First, it offers us a case of studying crazy inconsistencies to which any too dogmatic logical reasoning can lead.From this point of view, the ultra-liberal-or rather neoliberal-paralogism of artificially stimulated competition advanced by the European Commission and the CRE is worthy of scholastic education on syllogisms.In short, the public power claims to intervene by increaaaasing the TRV, and thus sACrificing the interest of consumers, "in the name of the principle of competition". Or, aux yeux de la Commission européenne elle-même, un tel principe est légitimé par le fait que « seule la concurrence permet de défendre l’intérêt des consommateurs »^[45].Marcel Boiteux and the economists of the Robert Schuman Foundation did not fail to have fun with this tasty paradox [46]. Dans un article intitulé « Les ambiguïtés de la concurrence », l’auteur du problème de Ramsey-Boiteux, maître à penser des politiques de tarification publique, déclarait : « avec la suppression des tarifs régulés, il ne s’agit plus d’ouvrir la concurrence pour faire baisser les prix, mais d’élever les prix pour favoriser la concurrence! »^[47].

Deuxièmement, cette affaire nous permet de constater que derrière la prétendue neutralité axiologique du « jeu pur et parfait de la concurrence » avancé par la Commission, se cAChe une entreprise politique visant à démanteler le monopole de distribution du secteur public de nombreux États membres^[48].We see here what constitutes the heart of a political ideology at the same time as its quadrature of the circle.In order to switch the maximum of customer households from the regulated public system to the private market, competing suppliers must be able to compete with EDF TRV.However, in France, the latter are currently simply incapable of it. La Commission et la CRE multiplient alors les initiatives politiques afin d’altérer les règles du jeu de façon plus ou moins conforme à leurs dogmes, osant pour cela user de méthodes coercitives[49] ou même renier certains postulats idéologiques originels quant au fonctionnement des marchés^[50].

This observation brings us to our third point.The case in which we are immersed calls into question the illusion ACcording to which the competition systematically tends to an optimal smoothing of the tariffs for the consumer and should therefore constitute the only horizon of operating markets [51]. Comme le résume l’économiste Paul de Grauwe, « il existe bel et bien des limites au marché »^[52][53].From this point of view, the first pragmatic observation which is essential is that if the CRE is reduced to ask the government to intervene in order to artificially increaaaase the prices of the electricity resource, the market is fallible and it isfar from being self -regulated [54].

In addition, certain sectors, including network ACtivities (trains, energy distribution), constitute "natural monopolies".This means that they have traditionally been organized as such because they naturally have an interest in it [55].Indeed, these are ACtivities where economies of scale and the costs of entering the market are so considerable that the public community must control the latter in order to prevent it from falling into the hands of a limited number ofPrivate operators. Comme cela a déjà été le cas par le passé dans des secteurs comme le transport ferroviaire au début du XXe siècle aux États-Unis^[56] ou la distribution d’électricité en Californie au début des années 2000 (scandale Enron), les ACteurs privés pourraient profiter de leur position dominante afin de soutirer une rente d’oligopole en pratiquant des prix trop élevés auprès de leurs clients ou en évinçant une demande jugée trop coûteuse à satisfaire. Une telle dynamique emporte des implications dramatiques en termes d’ACcroissement des inégalités entre les consommateurs, et donc d’érosion du fonctionnement démocratique des marchés^[57][58]^[59][60][61].

À ce titre, comme le disent Jean-Pierre Hansen et JACques Percebois, « le marché de distribution de l’électricité n’est pas un marché comme les autres » parce que « l’électricité doit à la fois être perçue comme une marchandise qui peut s’échanger et un service public qui requiert une intervention de l’État » ^[62]. L’observation est a fortiori justifiée compte tenu du fait qu’un phénomène de monopolisation est ACtuellement à l’œuvre dans des pans entiers des économies développées[63]^[64]. Sont notamment concernées les ACtivités de réseaux et celles qui nécessitent des investissements infrastructurels ou informationnels considérables^[65][66]. Or, le phénomène d’hyper-concentration aux mains d’un secteur privé sur-consolidé génère une dégradation de la diversité, du prix et de la qualité des biens et services proposés aux consommateurs^[67][68].

As part of a private market operation in the electricity sector, another risk is linked to the fACt that certain peripheral users could be purely and simply excluded from the distribution services due to the costs of ACcess to the offer thatrepresent the connection and maintenance of the electrical network for the latter, especially in poorly served territories [69]. De ce point de vue, le service public de l’électricité permet la péréquation tarifaire, en subventionnant les coûts d’ACcès des ménages[70][71]^[72]. La loi du 10 février 2000, relative à la modernisation et au développement du service public de l’électricité, avait consACré cette notion de service public de l’électricité dans le droit français, qui « a pour objet de garantir l’approvisionnement en électricité sur l’ensemble du territoire national, dans le respect de l’intérêt général (…) des principes d’égalité et de continuité du territoire, et dans les meilleures conditions de sécurité, de qualité, de coûts, de prix et d’efficACité économique, sociale et énergétique »^[73].

It is therefore relevant to consider the energy market as a service of general interest, a fortiori given the fACt that our national territory is a vector of potential inequalities because of its many rural areas, various altitudes, islandor ultra-marine [74] [75].These realities are to be compared to those of other European countries like Germany or the Netherlands, whose populations are distributed in a more homogeneous manner and in territories much more densely populated and imposing much less physical constraints.This elementary argument of economic geography [76] seems to have never been heard by the European Commission which considers that there is no geographic or institutional specificity in the functioning of the national markets.

In addition, the neoclassical theory of the market adopts the postulate of a homogeneous offer and ignores the question of the unequal quality of goods and services provided to consumers.However, the liberalization of the distribution sector to individuals has resulted in a spectACular degradation and variable geometry of the quality of energy distribution services to individuals.In France, there is in particular a surge in the number of complaints for harassment linked to telephone canvassing, disputes relating to disputes of abusive subscriptions, or even denunciations of misleading commercial prACtices. À tel point que Jean Gaubert, Médiateur National de l’Énergie (MNE), s’en est inquiété dans son rapport annuel, publié en mai dernier^[77][78].

According to the survey conducted by the MNE, 56% of French people questioned said that they were unthinked in a untimely manner by at least one distributor in 2018, an increaaaase of more than 50% in one year.In order to increaaaase their customers, several suppliers have also used aggravated deception prACtices.The MNE highlighted the multiplication of telephone demarchage aimed at informing false legislative measures under which the change of supplier would be compulsory.Even more serious, the number of households striking the MNE for change of gas or electricity supplier without their knowledge has also gone, increaaaasing by 40% by one year. Plusieurs fournisseurs d’électricité ont même eu recours à des stratégies de souscriptions de contrats cAChées, notamment à l’occasion de la vente de produits électroménagers dans des magasins grand public^[79].

Enfin, comme les travaux des théoriciens britanniques de la welfare economics l’ont démontré^[80], le secteur public doit prendre en compte le coût environnemental des ACtivités de production d’énergie, passé sous silence dans le cadre du fonctionnement de marché privé^[81][82].The question is crucial with regard to the energy sector, not only with regard to nuclear and its radioACtive waste at half-years of millions of years [83] [84], but also waste generated by production infrastructureother energies whose state does not hold the production monopoly, such as solar [85].Such environmental externalities are in principle not assumed by private players [86] [87], a fortiori within the framework of an operating paradigm separating (public) and distribution ACtivities (private) of electricity.

Regulations to be reinvented

Regarding the electricity distribution market in France, it therefore seems that the benefits of liberalization and privatization policies are more an ideological horizon than an empirical reality.If reality there is, it is rather linked to the way in which these policies are translated today on the household portfolio. 12% d’entre eux sont aujourd’hui en situation de précarité énergétique^[88]. Dans les régions françaises les plus touchées par ce phénomène, comme le Grand-Est ou la Bourgogne-Franche-Comté, ce pourcentage s’élève d’ores-et-déjà à 25% de la population ou plus^[89][90].It should still increaaaase, given the inflation of the prices of energies and the stagnation of income from the first three deciles, among which is most of the energy -efficient households.The social cost of the “paralogism of competition” is therefore considerable.It leads millions of French people to consider their future standard of living with less confidence.

As the lawyer Alain Supiot sums it up, "there are therefore good reasons to subtrACt from the omnipotence of the market of products or services which, such as electricity, gas, post office, highways or railways, restOn a unique technical network on a territory level, meet needs shared by the whole population and whose management and maintenance are part of long time which is not that, micro-conjunitement, markets.In this area, France had particularly suitable legal structures, hybrids of private law and public law, which had demonstrated their ability to combine economic and social justice efficiency. Le bilan particulièrement désastreux de la privatisation de ces services doit inciter à faire évoluer ces structures plutôt qu’à les privatiser »^[91].In France as elsewhere in Europe, it is urgent to change the regulatory paradigm of the electricity sector.

[1] The world.The prices of electricity still increaaaase, those of the gas drop slightly.July 29, 2019.https: // www.the world.fr/Economy/Article/2019/07/29/Les Prix-de-L-Electricite-Augmentant-enCore-Ceux-du-Gaz-Baiss-legerement_5494698_3234.html

[2] The cross.Electricity, why regulated prices increaaaased by 5.9%.May 31, 2019.https: // www.the cross.com/Economy/France/Electricite-Pourquoi-Tarifs-Reglements-Augmentant-59-2019-05-31-1201025744

^[3]Observatoire National de la Précarité Énergétique, Centre Scientifique et Technique du Bâtiment.Analysis of energy precariousness in the light of the 2013 National Housing (ENL) survey (ENL).November 8, 2016.https: // onpe.org/sites/default/files/pdf/onpe/onpe_cstb_indicators_pe_enl_2013.pdf

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^[7]Fondation Abbé Pierre (2017).Energy precariousness in infographic.Focus on energy precariousness in France.https: // www.-Abbe-Pierre Foundation.FR/Nos-Publations/Staff-of-Mal-Logement/Les-Infographies-du-Lotment/La-Prcarite-Energetique-en-Infography

^[8]CREAI-ORS Languedoc-Roussillon (2013).Links between energy precariousness and health: joint analysis of surveys carried out in Hérault and Douaisis.https: // www.-Abbe-Pierre Foundation.FR/Documents/PDF/Report_Precarite_energetique_Sante_Conjoire_vf.pdf

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^[10]Commission Européenne (2012).Positive effects of competition policy: how is competition policy important for consumers?http: // ec.europa.EU/Competition/CONSUMERS/WHY_FR.html

[11] See Directives 1996/92/EC, 1998/30ce, 2003/54/CE and 2003/55/CE.(1.European Commission.Directive 1996/92/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 Concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in Electricity;2.European Commission.Directive1998/30/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 Concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in Natural Gas;3.European Commission.Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 Concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in Electricity and Repealing Directive 96/92/EC - Statements made with look to de -commissioning and waste management ACtivities;4.European Commission.Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 26, 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market of natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC).

^[12]Légifrance.Law n ° 2000-108 of February 10, 2000 relating to the modernization and development of the public electricity service.

^[13]Légifrance.Law n ° 2004-803 of August 9, 2004 relating to the public service of electricity and gas and to electrical and gas companies.

[14] EDF France (2018).EDF jurisdiction-legal statutes.https: // www.EDF.fr/groupe-EDF/espACes-dedies/investisseurs-ACtionnaires/statuts-d-EDF

^[15]Légifrance.Law n ° 2006-1537 of December 7, 2006 relating to the energy sector.

^[16]Commission Européenne (2012).Positive effects of competition policy: how is competition policy important for consumers?http: // ec.europa.EU/Competition/CONSUMERS/WHY_FR.html

^[17]Commission Européenne.Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 26, 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market of natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/.

[18] El País.¿Ha Funcionado la LiberalizACión del Mercado Eléctrico en España?November 15, 2018.https: // cincodias.Elpais.com/cincodias/2018/11/14/MERCADOS/1542207624_665776.html

[19] El Correo.The LiberalizACión del Sector Eléctrico: Decadas Dos of Luces y sombras.December 10, 2018.https: // www.elcorreo.com/Economia/Tu-Economia/LiberalizACion-Sector-Electrico-20181207175056-NT.html

^[20]Le Monde.Market and electricity, dogma loses Europe.September 4, 2017.https: // www.the world.fr/blog/huet/2017/09/04/le-mailche-et-lelectricite-le-dogme-perd-Lerope/

[21] INSEE First n ° 1746.French spending on electricity since 1960.April 4, 2019.https: // www.INSEE.FR/FR/Statistics/3973175

^[22]Légifrance.Law n ° 2010-1488 of December 7, 2010 relating to the new organization of the electricity market.

^[23]Slate.Nuclear, wind ... What is the cheapest energy in France?November 30, 2011.http: // www.slate.FR/Story/46785/Nucleaire-Eolien-Energie-Moir-France

[24] Knowledge of energies (2013).Electricity production costs in France.https: // www.Knowledge of.Org/Pedagogical/Couts-de-Production-de-L-Electricite-en-France

[25] Le Monde, AFP.The ministerial decreaaae fixing the prices for the sale of nuclear electricity published in the JORF.May 20, 2011.https: // www.the world.fr/Economy/Article/2011/05/20/L-Arrete-Ministeriel-Fixant-les-Tarifs-Pour-la-Vente-de-L-Electricite-Nucleaire-Publie -au-Jo_1524752_3234.html

[26] Energy regulation committee.Arenh's requests for 2019.November 29, 2018.https: // www.creaaa.FR/Actualites/Les-Demandes-D-Arenh-Pour-2019

[27] National Assembly.AM.CD153 number. 1^erjuin 2019.

[28] National Assembly.AM.N ° CE357.June 14, 2019.

[29] Les Échos.Electricity: how the government wants to stabilize the bill.June 18, 2019.https: // www.the echoes.FR/Industry-service/Energy-Environment/Electricite-Comment-le-Government-Veut-Stabilization-La-Fature-1029981

[30] Senate.AM.n ° 200 rect.bis.July 16, 2019.

[31] The point.Electricity: this market where competition does not work.May 16, 2019.https: // www.point.fr/Economy/Electricite-Ce-Marche-Ou-la-Concreaate-Ne-Marche-Pas-16-05-2019-2313063_28.php

[32] Energy regulation committee.Deliberation of the CRE proposing the regulated electricity sales prices.February 7, 2019.https: // www.creaaa.FR/Documents/Deliberations/Proposal/Proposal-des-Tarifs-Reglements-de-Vente-d-Electricite

[33] Transposed in French law, this notion was specified by the Council of State in a judgment of 2015, being defined as: “The fACulty for an operator competing with EDF to offer offers at prices equal to or lower thanregulated prices ".See CE, judge in summary proceedings, January 7, 2015, National Association of Energy retailers (Anode), n ° 386076.

[34] Energy Regulatory Commission (2018).Electricity retail market.https: // www.creaaa.FR/Electricite/Marche-de-Detail-de-L-Electricite

[35] LEGIFRANCE.Law n ° 2019-486 of May 22, 2019 relating to the growth and transformation of companies.

^[36]CE, Ass., July 19, 2017, National Association of Energy Costaders (Anode), n ° 370321.

[37] CLCV, UFC-Que-Choisir.Open letter to the President of the Republic.April 11 and 12, 2019.http: // www.CLCV.Org/Images/CLCV/Letter_Overte_emmanuel_MACron_11042019.pdf;https: // www.what to choose.Org/Action-EUFC-Que-Choisir-Hausse-du-Tarif-l-Electricite-au-President-de-la-Republique-de-La-Cour-Circuiter-N65619/

[38] CLCV.Increase in the price of electricity: CLCV and UFC-Que-Choisir will seize the Council of State.May 15, 2019.http: // www.CLCV.org/energies/hausse-du-prix-de-l-electricite-la-CLCV-va-saisir-le-conseil-d-etat-pour-demander-son-annulation.html

[39] RTL.Electricity: "Increase EDF prices to support competition".May 31, 2019.https: // www.RTL.FR/Actu/consumption/Prices-of-the-electrical-comment-Explication-a-a-Hausse-de-5-9-7797743600

^[40]Autorité de la concurrence.Notice n ° 19-A-07 of March 25, 2019 relating to the fixing of regulated electricity sales prices.

^[41]Le Figaro.Jean-Bernard Lévy: "Private fortunes were built on the bACk of the EDF park".May 15, 2019.http: // www.Le Figaro.fr/societes/jean-bernard-levy-des-fortunes-privees-se-sont-construites-sur-le-dos-du-parc-d-EDF-20190515

^[42]BFMTV.Jean-Bernard Lévy: "Everything is organized for EDF to lose customers!»».June 13, 2019.https: // bfmbusiness.BFMTV.com/mediaplayer/video/jean-bernard-levy-tout-est-organise-pour-qu-EDF-perde-des-clients-1168130.html

^[43]IFRAP.Electricity price: why is it wrong.April 25, 2019.https: // www.ifrap.ORG/Agriculture-and-Energy/Prix-de-Lelectricite-Pouquoi-Ca-Né-Va-Pas

^[44]Le Monde.Tribune: Henri Guaino: "EDF: towards dismantling?»».February 8, 2002.https: // www.the world.fr/archives/article/2002/02/08/EDF-vers-le-demantelement_4209384_1819218.html

^[45]Commission européenne (2012).Positive effects of competition policy: how is competition policy important for consumers?http: // ec.europa.EU/Competition/CONSUMERS/WHY_FR.html

[46] Robert Schuman Foundation (2008).Ivoa Alavoine, Thomas Veyrenc: “Community ideology vs.National realism?The thorny problem of electricity rates ".https: // www.Robert-Schuman.EU/FR/DOC/Questions-d-Europe/QE-95-FR.pdf

^[47]Futuribles.Marcel Boiteux: “The ambiguities of the competition.Electricity in France and the liberalization of the electricity market ".June 1, 2007.https: // www.future.com/fr/Revue/331/Les-Ambiguits-de-la-Contempicite-de-FR/

^[48]Le Monde Diplomatique.Aurélien Bernier: "electricity, the price of competition".May 2018.https: // www.diplomatic world.FR/2019/05/Bernier/59843

[49] See aforementioned offense procedures, initiated by the European Commission against the French Republic.

^[50]Dans la théorie économique néoclassique, le principe de concurrence pure et parfaite n’admet pas que des ACteurs privés de l’offre bénéficient de situation de rentes de profitabilité, qui sont considérées comme un élément de concurrence déloyale et un coin (« wedge »)dans la réalisation de l’équilibre de marché.See: European Union - Europa EU (2019).Competition: preserve and promote fair competition prACtices.https: // Europa.EU/European-Union/Topics/Competition_fr

[51] French documentation.State, market and competition: the reasons for public intervention.In Market competition and regulation.French notebooks n ° 313.https: // www.LADOCUMENTATION FRANCAISE.fr/var/storage/libris/3303330403136/3303330403136_ex.pdf

^[52]Paul de Grauwe (2015).Market limits: oscillation between state and capitalism.PrefACed by Jean-Paul Fitoussi.Brussels.Upper Boeck.

[53] Financial Times.The Limits of the Market by Paul De Grauwe - From Excess to Retress.April 7, 2017.https: // www.FT.com/content/6e07ebe2-19eb-11e7-BCAC-6D03D067F81F

[54] Confers the expression "Market Failure" used by Yves Croissant and Patricia Vornetti, economists teAChing at the University of Reunion and atParis-I Panthéon-Sorbonne University.See: French documentation.State, market and competition: the reasons for public intervention.In Market competition and regulation.French notebooks n ° 313.https: // www.LADOCUMENTATION FRANCAISE.fr/var/storage/libris/3303330403136/3303330403136_ex.pdf

[55] Ibid.

^[56]Stanford University – Stanford CS(1996).Rise of Monopolies: The Development of the Railroad Monopoly in the United States.In Andy Conigliaro, Joshua Elman, Jeremy Schreiber, Tony Small: "The Danger of Corporate Monopolies".

^[57]The Commonwealth Club of California.Harvard University Professor Tim Wu: Inside Tech Monopolies.San Francisco.February 22, 2019.https: // www.Youtube.com/watch? V = pqvrp3-8yhq

[58] The New Yorker.Opinion: Tim Wu: "The Oligopoly Problem".April 15, 2013.https: // www.New Yorker.Com/Tech/Annals-De-Technology/The-Oligopoly-Problem

^[59]The New York Times.The Opinion Section: Tim Wu: "Be Afraid of Economic Bigness.Be Very Afraid.November 10, 2018.https: // www.nytimes.com/2018/11/10/Opinion/Sunday/Fascism-Economy-Monopoly.html? login = fACebook

^[60]The Washington Post. Opinion: Felicia Wong: « Why monopolies are threateningAMerican democrACy ».December 8, 2017.https: // www.Washington Post.com/news/democrACy-post/wp/2017/12/08/why-monopolies-are-threatening-american-democrACy/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.41C2A742748C

^[61]The Washington Post.Opinion: Tim Wu: "A Call to Save DemocrACy by Battling Private Monopolies".December 28, 2018.https: // www.Washington Post.com/gdpr-consent/? Destination =%2Foutlook%2fa-Call-to-save-DemocrACy-By-Battling-Monopolies%2F2018%2F12%2F27%2F949CF8F4-06FE-1E9-A3F0-71C95106D96A_Story.html%3f&utm_term=.6D7239A41CD1

^[62]Jean-Pierre Hansen, JACques Percebois (2017).Electric transition (s) (s).What Europe and the markets could not tell you.PrefACed by Gérard Mestrallet.Paris.Odile JACob.

[63] The Atlantic.The Return of the Monopoly: An Infographic.April 2013.https: // www.theatlantic.com/Magazine/Archive/2013/04/The-Chartist/309271/

^[64]The Guardian.Joseph Stiglitz: The New Era of Monopoly is here.May 13, 2016.https: // www.theguardian.com/Business/2016/May/13/-New-Era-Monopoly-Joseph-Stiglitz

^[65]Stanford University – Stanford CS(1996). Rise of Monopolies: the making of MicrosoFT.In Andy Conigliaro, Joshua Elman, Jeremy Schreiber, Tony Small: "The Danger of Corporate Monopolies".

^[66]TheLondon School of Economics – LSE Blog.Patrick Barwise: "Why Tech Markets Are Winner-Take-All".June 14, 2018.https: // blogs.lse.AC.UK/Mediapolichyproject/2018/06/14/Why-Tech-Markets-Ainner-Take-All/

^[67]The New York Times. The opinion section: David Leonhardt: « The monopolization ofAMerica ».November 25, 2018.https: // www.nytimes.com/2018/11/25/Opinion/Monopolies-in-the-Us.html

^[68]Robert Reich. The monopolization ofAMerica ».May 6, 2018.https: // www.Youtube.com/Watch? V = KLFO-2T1QPQ

[69] French documentation.State, market and competition: the reasons for public intervention.In Market competition and regulation.French notebooks n ° 313.https: // www.LADOCUMENTATION FRANCAISE.fr/var/storage/libris/3303330403136/3303330403136_ex.pdf

[70] Frank P. Ramsey(1927).A contribution to the theory of taxation.The Economic Journal.Flight.37, n ° 145.

[71]Marcel Boiteux(1956).On the management of public monopolies required to balance budget.Econometrica, n ° 24.

^[72]Observatoire de l’Industrie électrique (2017).A story of tariff equalization.https: // observatory-electricality.FR/IMG/PDF/OIE _-_ PERME_PEDAGO_PEREQUATION_072017.pdf

^[73]Légifrance.Law n ° 2000-108 of February 10, 2000 relating to the modernization and development of the public electricity service.https: // www.legifrance.gouv.FR/AFFICTEXT.Do? Cidtext = jorftext000000750321

[74] France Strategy.2017/2027 - Territorial dynamics and inequalities.July 7, 2016.https: // www.strategy.gouv.FR/Publications/20172027-dynamics-aging-territorial

[75]Pierre Veltz(1996).Globalization, cities and territories.Archipelago economy.Paris.University Press of France.

[76] The Atlantic (2005).Richard Florida: "The World in Numbers: The World is Spiky".https: // www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/images/from 200510/World-Is-Spiky.pdf

^[77]Médiateur National de l’Énergie (2018). Rapport annuel d’ACtivité 2018.https: // www.Energy-mediator.fr/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/RA-MNE-2018-interACtif.pdf

[78] Marianne.Electricity: heresy of opening to competition. 1^erjuillet 2017.https: // www.Marianne.net/debattons/tribunes/energie-electricite-EDF-heresie-concurrence

^[79]Ibid.

^[80]Arthur Cecil Pigou(1920).The Economics of Welfare.London. MACmillan.

^[81]International Monetary Fund.Thomas Helbling: "Externalities: prices do not capture all costs".December 18, 2018.https: // www.MFI.org/external/pubs/FT/fandd/basics/external.htm

^[82]Paul de Grauwe (2015).Market limits: oscillation between state and capitalism.PrefACed by Jean-Paul Fitoussi.Brussels.Upper Boeck.

[83] OECD (2003). Électricité nucléaire : quels sont les coûts externes ?https: // www.OECD-NEA.Org/NDD/Reports/2003/NEA4373-Couts-External.pdf

[84] Institute of Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (2013). Quelle est la durée de vie d’un déchet radioACtif à haute ACtivité ? https://irsn.Libcast.com/dechets/dechets_quelle_est_la_duree_de_vie_d_un_dechet_radioACtif_a_haute_ACtivite-mp4/player

[85]GreenpeACe (2019). Quel est l’impACt environnemental des panneaux solaires ?https: // www.greenpeACe.fr/impACt-environnemental-solaire/

[86]Elinor Ostrom(1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective ACtion.Cambridge University Press.https: // wtf.TW/REF/OSTROM_1990.pdf

[87] Garrett Hardin (2018).The tragedy of the commons. PréfACé par Dominique Bourg.University Press of France.

^[88]Observatoire National de la Précarité Énergétique.Energy precarious dashboard, 2018 edition.May 6, 2019.https: // onpe.org/sites/default/files/table_de_bord_2018_v2_1.pdf

^[89]INSEE Dossier Grand-Est, n°10.Energy vulnerability in the Grand Est.The Grand Est, region most affected by energy vulnerability to heat.January 25, 2019.https: // www.INSEE.FR/FR/Statistics/3703441

[90] INSEE Flash Bourgogne, n ° 31.One in three households exposed to energy vulnerability in Burgundy-Franche-Comté.December 15, 2015.https: // www.INSEE.FR/FR/Statistics/1304080

[91] Alain Supiot (2010). L’esprit de Philadelphie : la justice sociale fACe au marché total.Paris.Threshold.